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Even a casual glance through the daily newspaper will reveal at
least one article on government expenditures to pTOvide some service
or facility to the general public.

Many of these expenditures provide

improved transportation services, since transportation is nne function
that serves the entire community and the costs associated with these
services generally exceed the capability of the private sector.

Large

expenditures for highways, airfields and harbors have become accepted
areas for government initiative.

However, as dollars become scarce

and the demands for limited resources increase, the average citizen
has shown an ever increasing awareness and interest in the manner his
tax dollar is spent.

The sheer number, intensity and tone of concern

contained in these newspaper articles is an indication of this interest.
The recent threat of a shortage of heating fuel and ga.soline has
precipitated debate and discussion on the so-called approaching Itenergy
crisis."

This problem strikes close to the heart and pocketbook of the

average citizen.

The solution of this problem can be greatly effected

by the expenditure of government funds, particularly in tbe field of
transportation.

Ironically the leisure and security provLded by the

abundance of cheap energy, has allowed the average citizen greater
time to study and debate the desirability of these expenditures.
Therefore, an examination of the workings of the decision process of
a typical Federal public works project is both
The

..

u.s. Army

t~ly

and pertinent.

Corps of Engineers is one of the largest single

Federal agencies involved in the planning, design and construction of
public waterborne transportation facilities.
1

A critical Teview of a

typical Corps of Engineers
•

surv~y

report on the improvements to a

harbor should provide an insight to the means of allocating the costs
and benefits resulting from government expenditures.

The purpose of

this paper is to review this process using as a vehicle the proposed
improvements to the navigation channel at New London, Connecticut.
It surprises many foreigners to learn of the extent to which the

u.s.

Army is involved in public works of a non-military nature.

In

fact there was considerable debate and hesitation on the use of the
Federal government undertaking internal improvements.
its

However, since

first year the national government has undertaken various public

works.

The Corps of Engineers involvement is problematical, but there

is evidence that they did participate in these ear1y·works.

The Army

engineers were specifically mentioned in occasional laws, but the
enactment of the 1824 Rivers and Harbors Act clearly connected the
Corps with the prosecution of internal improvements as an agent of the
Federal government. (1,2)
Starting in 1830 the Corps has periodically reported to Congress
on improvements recommended for the harbor at New London and along the
navigable reaches of the Thames River.

These improvements have ranged

from the simple removal of a few boulders in 1878 to the extensive
channel deepening during the 1930's.

Federal expenditures for improve-

ments, maintenance and operation of the waterway through June 1969 have
totaled $809,501 in New London harbor and $2,563,313 in the Thames
River.

These amounts do not include those funds spent by the Navy and

others to improve portions of the waterway for their specific needs.
2

The initiative for a project such as the one at New London can
come from a variety of sources.

Generally some local group of private

individua1s t businessmen or commercial interests will start the ball
rolling.

For new projects the local interests will normally channel

their request for improvements thru their political representatives,
either governor, mayor or congressional delegates.

They may consult

directly with the Division Engineer t the senior representative of the
Corps of Engineers for their locality, to obtain his advice and
assistance.

If the project appears to have sufficient merit the politi-

cal representatives may request the Public Works Committee in Congress
to authorize the Corps of Engineers to investigate and report on the
feasibility of the project.
If a previous report has been made for the area the Committee may
adopt a resolution authorizing the Board of Engineers for Rivers and
Harbors to review and update the report to reflect the effects of the
requested improvements.

If a previous report has not been made and the

Committee is convinced of the need for an original report, the authorization for the Corps investigation will be included in a bill for
consideration by Congress.
for t?e study.

When passed, the bill becomes a directive

In addition to specific directives for survey reports,

the Congress has given the Chief of Engineers funds and authority for
general investigations.
In the New London harbor the original report was authorized by the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of August 11, 1888, which allowed
the Secretary of the Army (then the Secretary of War)
3

n • • • at

his

discretion to cause examination or surveys and the cost of estimated
improvements • • • be made at • • • New London, Connecticut • • • ,,(3)

For

these civil functions the chain of authority extends directly from the
President to the Secretary of the Army, usually through the General
Council in the Office of the Secretary of the Army, to the Chief of
Engineers.

Bypassed are the Secretary of Defense and Chief of Staff

of the Army.
Later resolutions of Congress continued and expanded the authority
to report on the New London harbor.
2 December 1963.

The latest was adopted on

Accordingly, the Chief of Engineers assigned the

review of these previous reports to the New England Division on
11 December 1963.
In any analysis of a problem the first and probably most important
step is to determine the objective.

In this study the objective is

well defined by Federal legislation and common practice developed over
one hundred and fifty years of similar projects.

The objective is to

determine the economic justification of modifying the existing Federal
navigation project for the New London harbor and the Thames River channel.
To obtain data for the report the Corps made detailed hydrographic
surveys, soundings, and probings; studied maps, charts and aerial
photographs, commercial statistics and other data pertaining to waterways; and held public hearings at New London on February 24, 1964 and
April 12, 1972.

Survey officers contacted local commercial interested

and affected governmental agencies to gather additional data on the
proposed project.

4

The criteria established

~or

the selection of which improvements

to recommend is based upon the dollar value of benefits to the general
public exceeding the cost to the Federal government.

In some cases

local contribution to the project includes funds, as well as easements,
rights-of-way, relocations of utilities and highways, and other similar
actions.

Local cooperation in this project did not require any funds,

but was limited to the standard assurances.

These included to provide

without cost all lands, easements and rights-of-way required for the
construction and maintenance of aids to navigation; to hold and save
the United States free from damages due to construction; to make
"

necessary alterations of underwater utilities; and to improve berth
facilities and access channels commensurate with project depth.
This criteria provides the basis of the Chief of Engineer's
recommendation to the Public Works Committee.

Other considerations

that cannot be quantified are included in the report, such as
environmental impacts, general or long-term social benefits and other
important unquantifiables.
The Public Works Committee considers all of these factors plus
political realities in reaching a decision on a specific project.

It

is not unusual for projects with excellent economic justification to
be disapproved or unfunded, while seemingly less deserving projects
are completed.

The decision is undoubtedly based on the unquantifiable

factors, some of which, but certainly not all are included in the report.
In this study the Division Engineer first considers the validity
of the need for the improvements based upon a broad economic survey

5
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of the overall situation in the area and consideration of the economic
trends for the future.

Custom has established the standard economic

life for this type of improvement at fifty years.

However, in this

study many of the projections were considered only thru the year 2000.
The accuracy of the projections beyond this point are of questionable
value.

When in doubt the Corps has generally tended to take a

conservative approach.
The selection of a fifty year life for navigation projects can
be criticized on the basis that not every project will have an equal
life.

However, the use of a standard project life does provide a

method for comparing projects.

~

..

It also removes the difficult and

politically controversial necessity of determining the individual life
of each project.
This study focuses upon three aspects of the harbor in this
preliminary estimate.

These aspects are the terminals and transfer

facilities, existing and prospective commerce and vessel traffic.
For a relatively small port, New London has a wide variety of
terminal facilities currently in use.

A total of S3 piers are

available, the greatest number (17) are operated by the

u.s.

Naval

Submarine Base; nine are involved in marine repair and construction,
of which the largest single interest is the Electric Boat Division
of the General Dynamics Corporation; eight handle a variety of
petroleum products and the remainder are used to handle chemicals;
seafood; molasses; general cargo; fuel oil for power generation; scrap
metal; passenger and vehicle ferries; and mooring and storage, of
6

~ ..

•

which the U.S. Coast Guard is the largest single user.

A survey of

these terminals became the starting point for the determination of
those commercial activities which would be the most likely beneficiaries of the proposed improvements.
The commerce in terms of cargo tonnage was analyzed for the
preceeding five year period.

In the period 1965-1970 the New London

harbor registered a 300% increase for a 1970 total of 3.9 million short
tons.

In 1970 over 90% of this tonnage represented petroleum and

petroleum products. (See Chart 1).

This single ca-modity accounted

for the sharp increase in harbor tonnages in the years 1968 thru 1970.
One of the primary causes of this spectacular rise was the conversion
of several coal fired electric generating stations to oil fired units.
The remaining tonnage has remained relatively stable and is made up of
ship hull sections, synthetic chemical products, insulating materials,
molasses, textiles, lumber and miscellaneous products.
By contrast the tonnage of commerce using the Thames River channel
has actually declined during the same period. (See Chart 2).

However,

construction of a new 400 megawatt electric power plant and the
conversion of a coal fired electric power plant in MOntville will require
900,000 tons of residual fuel annually.

This should substantially

increase the tonnage of commerce in the river, which totaled only
677,000 tons in 1970.
Overall the waterborne commerce in this area has not kept pace
with the general population trends in Southeastern Connecticut during
the past twenty years.

However, the recent increase in waterborne
7
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commerce in the last three

year~

would indicate that the area is

experiencing increased activity.
The Connecticut State Development Commission is promoting a
program to develop industrial sites along the Thames River.

Presently

there are eleven industrial sites available for firms that would
require channel depths of 30 feet or more.

This is the only undeveloped

industrial land available with access to direct waterborne shipping in
the southeastern part of the state.

Although this potential industrial

development is a direct benefit, it is difficult to quantify and consequently was not used to raise the cost

bene~it

ratio.

The ground

rules for excluding these benefits are clearly set forth by Congress
and the Bureau of the Budget.

There has been some discussion and study

within the Corps to establish a means of including regional development
in the economic analysis.

Implementation of this is not expected in

the immediate future.
Next an analysis of the shipping traffic into the New London
harbor revealed that the port was used by 5,378 vessels in 1970,
excluding U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels.

As expected the majority

of the deep draft traffic consisted of petroleum tankers.

This traffic

is consistent with the trend toward larger capacity vessels, where
economics of scale can be realized.

The average tanker has increased

in size from 16,000 dwt in 1949 to 27,100 dwt in 1965.

By 1970 over

65% of the world tanker fleet exceeded 30,000 dwt.
Since the majority of the deep draft traffic consisted of tankers
the projection of petroleum usage was evaluated.
8

The

u.s.

Department

of Commerce predicts that the tonnage of petroleum products received
in east coast ports will increase 350% in the period 1966-2000.
is not

It

unreasonable to expect that New London will share in this

increase.

Therefore, this initial review of past trends in harbor

.

tonnage, known and anticipated industrial development, overall economic
expectations for the area, and trends in ship traffic, particularly as
they involve petroleum products, indicates that improvements in waterborne navigation will produce future economic benefits.

The exact

amount and the distribution of these benefits would require a more
detailed and comprehensive study.
t .

Once a general assessment revealed that the proposed project would
produce future benefits, it became necessary to pin down the exact
improvements desired by the local interests.

In order to accomplish

this the first public hearing was held in New London on
February 24, 1965.

The 72 persons in attendance represented Federal,

State and municipal government, shipping interests, terminal operators
and other individuals concerned with the improvements to the waterway.
As a result of this public hearing eleven specific improvements were
identified.
genera11y the problems of navigation in the waterway could be
resolved into three major categories.

The first is the present 33

foot depth, at mean low water, in the harbor is insufficient for the
larger vessels now coming into prominent service.

Second the channel

in the Thames River has numerous bends and other obstructions which

9
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CHART 1
COMMERCE IN NEW LONOON HARBOR
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make navigation in the river hazardous.

Third the maneuver area in

the approaches to the State Pier is limited and has resulted in damage
to both shipping and the pier.
Subsequent to this public hearing all industries and commercial
interests in the area known to have an existing or possible future
interest in the waterway improvements were contacted and asked to
respond to questionnaires.

These questionnaires would provide more

detailed and specific data upon which to base the analysis of the
benefits.

Follow-up visits by survey officers insured that all possible

benefits were considered.
Interestingly the Dow Chemical Company initially indicated little
interest in the proposed improvements, but upon learning the results
of the initial survey which did not recommend the channel deepening
to the company facilities, Dow Chemical requested and was granted
reconsideration.

The additional economic information provided by Dow

Chemical was considered, analyzed and integrated into the final report.
Although there are nine major terminal facilities that might
derive benefits from the improvements, only four were actually
seriously considered in the quantative analysis.
bene~iciaries

All of the possible

were studied in detail during this initial screening,

but only those that could clearly demonstrate a direct and calculable
economic benefit attributable to the waterway improvements were able
to survive the screening.
For example, even though the Charles Pfizer and Company, Inc.'
indicated that larger ships might be used in the future delivery of

10

molasses, this possibility could not be established with sufficient
certainty to justify inclusion as a benefit.

Similarly, the require-

ments of the U.S. Naval Submarine Base and the General Dynamics
Corporation for deeper channels to accommodate the new model submarines
to be constructed and stationed in the area, were not included in the
study.

This is based upon tWo fundamental principles.

First the

deeper channel depths would provide a benefit to the national defense
establishment.

This is not within the charter of public works projects.

The funding for defense projects must be charged against the military
program that it supports.

Secondly the Navy requirement is an
".

immediate one, and could reasonably be expected to be completed prior
to the approval of the Corps project.

Therefore, the Corps study could

not include these benefits in their analysis of the project.
The Corps study did evaluate the savings in dredging costs if the
Navy project were completed first.

The Navy channel would also reduce

the transportation savings that would be realized by the improved
channel.

Both of these economic impacts were evaluated and included

in the study, but they were not used as the justification of the
project.

The impact of the Navy dredging will be discussed in greater

detail later in this paper.
The initial screening concluded with four major waterway users,
who would directly benefit from the project.

These were:

the

Connecticut Light and Power Company, Dow Chemical Company, Hess Oil
Company and the State Pier.

11

For the Connecticut Light

~nd

Power Company the benefits consisted

of lower transportation costs for the residual fuel delivered to its
Montville electric power generating plant.

This facility was estimated

to require 900,000 short tons of residual fuel annually.

To establish

the lowest possible delivery cost with the existing channel, several
alternatives were considered.

These included the transfer of the fuel

by barge or pipeline from.New London harbor, the use of offshore
terminals, direct delivery to the plant by smaller or partially loaded
ships, and delivery to a terminal facility located near the plant.

In

each of the beneficiaries it was necessary to establish a lowest
possible cost before improvements to the waterway, in order to have a
p.oint of comparison to calculate the benefits after the improvements
were completed.
Similarly the Dow Chemical Company would benefit by reduced
transportation charges on the liquid chemicals delivered to its plant
at Allyn Point.

Since this plant is only 1000 yards north of the

Montville electric power plant the two benefits could be combined
when the various incremental sections of the channel were studied.
Dow Chemical indicated that it planned to expand its facilities and
projected annual increases in receipts of liquid chemicals from 150,000
tons in 1975 to 450,000 tons by 1985.

Further increases were expected

to require the use of deep-draft tankers by 1994.
As anticipated from the preliminary estimates of commerce in the
harbor the greatest beneficiary appeared to be the Hess Oil Company.
The benefits that would accrue would be through the lower transportation

12
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charges for the delivery of bulk petroleum products.

Currently these

products are delivered from the company's refinery in the Virgin
Islands by tankers, which, because of the channel depth are only
partially loaded and must often wait for high tide to complete their
deliveries.

Since this particular activity was to be the major economic

factor in the decision process, it will be covered in greater detail.
The final beneficiary was the State Pier and the shipping using
that facility to deliver general cargo.

Due to a restricted maneuver

area, in the past seven year period, 1964-1971, two ships have been
involved in accidents while attempting to berth at the pier.

The

resulting damages to the pier and the ships amounted to $200,000.

The

economic benefit for improving the approaches was readily determined.
This amounted to an annual benefit of $29,000 when projected and
discounted over the 50 year project life.
The determination of the benefits that would accrue from the
navigation improvements to each of these four activities was deliberately
conservative.

The only benefits that were considered were those that

could be measured with a high degree of reliability.

If the achievement

of the benefit required a company to change it's modus operandi, then
the company had to demonstrate that if the waterway improvements were
completed, it would make the necessary changes to take advantage of
the improvements.
In order to establish the marginal benefit from the improvements,
several alternatives were considered.

In keeping with a conservative

approach, the industry need not demonstrate that it would use the least

13
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cost alternative, but the Corps assumption was that if a least cost
alternative were available the industry would use that alternative.
However, as will be discussed later the study considered the possibility
of the industry using a certain size tanker that would provide the
lowest delivery cost of petroleum.

This alternative was rejected,

because when the tanker industry as a whole was considered this would
not provide the optimum use of the tanker fleet.
In order to analyze the method of arriving at the dollar value of
the future benefits, the transportation savings for the petroleum
products delivered to Hess Oil Company will be examined in greater
I .

detail.

This procedure is representative of that followed in obtaining

the benefits to other activities.
From the general study of commerce in the harbor, it was obvious
that the benefit to the Hess Oil Company would result from reduced unit
transportation costs achieved by the economies of scale from the use of
deep-draft tankers.

A marginal analysis was used to calculate the

savings resulting from various improvements, above the cost of the best
alternative means of delivery.
Currently petroleum products are received in the harbor via
30-36,000 dwt foreign flag tankers arriving from the company refinery
in the Virgin Islands.

In order to arrive at the least cost alternative

means of delivery using the present waterway, three methods were
considered.
The first delivery method was to deliver the petroleum directly
to the New London terminal.

Since the analysis was conducted on the

margin, overhead, profit, agent fees and other fixed costs were
excluded.

The calculations considered the distance, speed, hourly

costs of ship operation, and loading and unloading time for the average
round trip between New London and the Virgin Islands for tanker sizes
varying between 30,000 and 50,000 dwt.

For a given channel depth the

delivery cost is smaller for the larger vessels, even though they must
be partially loaded to not exceed 31.6 feet draft. (See chart 3).
However, it was assumed that the 40-50,000 dwt tankers would be more
economically employed serving deep-draft harbors where their full
carrying capacity could be efficiently utilized, and that 36,000 dwt
tankers now being used, would be available for the forseeable future.
This analysis resulted in an estimated delivery cost of $2.40 per short
ton.
The next alternative delivery method considered the trans-shipment
by barge or pipeline from the deep-draft harbor under construction at
Providence, Rhode Island.

Since nearly 85% of the petroleum delivered

is residual oil, which has a high viscosity and requires a heated
pipeline to keep it flowing during winter months, this method would be
obviously impractical.

The cost of trans-shipment by barge was

determined to be $3.18 per ton, or $.78 more expensive than direct
shipment.
The last alternative considered an offshore terminal with pipeline distribution to land-based terminals.

Rough cost estimates by

private firms indicate that the cost of this facility would be about
$35 million.

Other factors to be considered include availability of a
-IS

CHART 3
DELIVERY COST IN NEW LONDON HARBOR
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sui.table site, the use of existing facilities, the attitude of local
interests, the willingness of the oil companies to install this facility
and the environmental impact of offshore oil transfers.

While it is

obvious that this alternative has the potential to greatly reduce the
unit delivery cost by utilizing even larger"tankers, the problems of
site selection and investment cost are substantial.

It would appear

that the quantity of petroleum demanded by the area would not justify
these expenditures by private industry.

Therefore the least competitive

delivery cost was established at $2.40 per short ton.
Once the cost of delivery has been determined for the present
waterway, the next step was to evaluate the savings that could be

...
achieved by incremental improvements.

The savings were calculated for

incremental increases in depth at two foot intervals between 34 to 42
feet.

For each depth the delivery cost was determined, using the most

economical size tanker. (See Chart 4).
fleet operations were considered.

Once more the probable tanker

For depths greater than 36 feet a

50,000 dwt tanker was considered both economical aDd reasonable.

At

36 foot depths the 40,000 dwt tanker, and for lesser depths the 36,000
dwt tanker, were selected based upon the assumptions of tanker fleet
operations discussed above.
The difference in the values determined for various improved
channel depths and $2.40 from the least cost use of the present channel
determined the savings achieved.

(Chart 5).

It would appear that the

40 foot channel would be the most beneficial, however, before the
analysis of annual benefits is complete the project tonnage of
petroleum must be considered.
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CHART 4
DELIVERY COST FOR VARIOUS TANKERS USING A 34-FOOT CHANNEL

I
~

i

t

$2.40

DELIVERY
COST PER 'ION
SAVINGS

$2.30

t
t

$2.20

r- t

I

•i
,

30,000 dwt

36,000 dwt 40,000 dwt

50,000 dwt

~

t

'

....
"

,~

TANKER SIZE

It

.

CHART 5
NEW LONDON HARBOR UNIT SAVINGS PER TON FOREIGN FLAG TANKERS
FROM THE VIRGIN ISLANUS
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To determine the tonnage of petroleum that would be delivered to
the harbor over the 50 year life of the project, two approaches were
used.

The first was an empirical investigation into the relationship

between population growth and shipments of petroleum.

•

The .second approach

utilized a recently completed study by Robert Nathan Associates for the

~.

Institute for Water Resources which analyzed the future delivery of
petroleum on the east coast.
In the first approach the population growth and petroleum shipments
on a national level were compared.

If a high degree of correlation

existed between these two factors, then the local population trends
could be used to determine the future petroleum commerce in the area.
The comparison on the national level was found to have large short-term
fluctuations due to the Korean conflict, recessions, tax cuts and other
transient economic factors.
for the correlation was

However, once these 'factors were accounted

sufficiently close to provide long-term trends.

The analysis of the population and petroleum activity in the New
London area showed even greater fluctuations than the national averages.
In addition to the factors affecting the national averages, a variety
of local conditions caused major changes in the shipment of petroleum.
The largest single factor was the conversion of coal fired electric
power plants to oil fired units.

Other factors included an increasing

concern about air pollution and the trend toward expanded uses of nuclear
power.

'.,
,t

Consequently the 1962 to 1967 growth rate of 4% per year was

considered to reflect short term conditions and was revised to a lower
figure of 3%.

17
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This figure was compared to the rate obtained from Robert
Nathan's "U.S. Deepwater Port Study" which indicated a long-term growth
rate for the Northeast at just over 2%.

Since this rate included

all of New England it would seem reasonable to adjust the value upward
to 3% for the harbor.

This growth rate was used to project the deep-

draft petroleum deliveries for the year 1978 at 1.9 million tons,
which would increase to 4.8 million tons by 2028.
These quantities of future petroleum deliveries thus derived
agreed with projections of energy growth made by the Department of the
Interior, Federal Power Commission, National Petroleum Institute,
1':. ..

and other agencies.

It was determined that the optimum size oil tanker

that would be used to meet this level of demand would be 50,000 dwt.
This is the reason that the unit savings shown in Chart 5 do not
increase once the 40 foot channel depth is achieved.
ledgable Corps representatives indicate that the

However, know-

opt~um

tanker may

have already increased to 60,000 dwt or greater.
Now the total benefit could be calculated.

Similar calculations

would provide the benefits for each of the four activities and for a

! .

.'".

i·

range of incremental improvements.
This total benefit was then converted into an annual benefit.
The immediate benefits were calculated by projecting the number of
tons received in the first year after completion of the project, i.e.
1978, and multiplying by the unit savings.

The savings from future

growth were discounted at 5-3/8% to obtain an annual value in current
dollars.

These estimates were made as follows:
18

.

$ 1,325,000

" Immediate Benefits (1978)
1,920,000 tons @ $0.69 per ton

622,000

b. Future Growth (average from 1978-2028)
2,880,000 tons @ $0.69 x 0.3134

$ 1,947,000

Total Average Annual Benefits to D~ep
Draft Petroleum Commerce in the Harbor"
The
Congress.

discount rate used for these calculations is determined by

•

It is possible to criticize this value as being too low,

however, the use of one standard value does allow the Public Works
Committee to judge the relative merits of competing projects without

".

having to constantly be concerned with a variety of discount rate
calculations.

~.

Once the benefits have been determined, the remainder of the quantitative analysis should be relatively simple.

Unlike many government

programs, the cost estimates on this type of project are easy to determine with a fair degree of accuracy.

The Corps has ample experience

with similar projects, so that once the composition and topography of
the bottom are known the costs of dredging are readily determined.
However, as shall be seen, there are costs associated with this type of
project that are not easy to identify and quantify.
The criteria for determining the amount of and extent of the channel
improvements is based upon the accommodation of two large vessels in an
overtaking or passing situation.

Based on experience in other water-

ways and results of model basin experiments a recommended range of lane
widths has been established.

The total width of the channels is deter-

mined by consideration of volume of traffic, vessel speed and
maneuverability, prevailing weather conditions, current, yawing factors
19
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and bottom material.

Where the heaviest traffic density could be

expected in the harbor the width was 600 feet.

In the Thames River

channel a single ship lane was determined to be satisfactory.

Using
~ .'

this criteria the channel would be 380 feet wide.

However, this width

would have required excessive dredging 1n shallow areas and it was
found to be more economical to provide additional depth but a smaller

f·

(350 feet) channel.
With the width of channel selected it was a simple matter to
arrive at the amount and cost of dredging.

Added to the cost of

dredging is the cost of disposal of the dredge spoil.

Several methods

were considered but the most economical means was disposal through the
use of barges and nearby ocean disposal areas.
Additional costs were involved in the relocation of a railroad
bridge and for aids to navigation in the new channel.
The Penn Central Railroad bridge was constructed in 1917 and the
clearance between the piers was no longer sufficient for the larger
ships that would be using the improved channel.

The cost to replace

the bridge was estimated to be $6,000,000, however, not all of this

~.

could be charged against the project.

~~- -~

Assuming a normal life span

for the bridge of 80 years, it would require replacement in 1997, or

L
t

~~

20 years after the beginning of the project life.

Based on the present

worth of the reconstruction in 1997 the portion of the cost chargeable
to the waterway improvements was reduced to $4,000,000.
The reduction in dredging costs as a result of the U.S.Navy
channel improvements was considered but not used to justify the project.
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At the same time costs were

reduc~d,

so were the benefits.

The least

unit transportation cost for the existing channel would be reduced by
the Navy dredging.

Therefore, the savings realized by the Corps

channel must be reduced accordingly.
Next, estimates were made to determine the cost'of annual maintenance for the completed project.

For each section of the channel and

each increment of depth these costs were added to the adjusted first
costs to determine the annual cost for the project.
The total cost of the project was adjusted to an annual basis over
the 50-year project life and using an interest rate of 5.375% for all
investments.
The following example shows how these costs were calculated:
"Project Cost Estimates
Dredging 3,260,000 C.y. @ $3.00
Contingencies 15%
Engineering and Design
Supervision and Administration
Total Corps of Engineers Cost
U.S. Coast Guard Aids to Navigation
Total Project Cost

9,780,000
1,470,000
$ 11,250,000
480,000
770,000
12,500,000
$
10,000
$ 12,510,000
$

Annua1 Charges
Interest and Amortization
$12,510,000 x 0.0580
Added Annual Maintenance
Dredging
Aids to Navigation
Total Annual Charges

$

723,000
34,000

$

1,000
758,000" 4

With the total benefits and costs identified for incremental
portions of the project and reduced to annual amounts, the final stage
of the quantitative analysis can be concluded.
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This consists of a

comparison of the costs and benefits and a selection of those improvements that will yield the optimum benefit to cost ratio.
From the analysis to this point, it can be readily seen that the
project can be divided into three distinct regions.
maneuver area at the State Pier.

The first is the

The annual cost of this portion of

the project was estimated at $11,000 and the annual benefits at $29,000,
which provides a benefit/cost ratio of 2.64.
The second area consists of the improvements from deep water to
the Hess Oil Company terminal.

The optimum depth was determined to be

40 feet by comparing the benefit/cost ratios for the incremental depths
of channel.

(See Chart 6).

In this case this depth would also yield

the maximum net benefits (See Chart 7).
The third area consists of the Thames River channel to the vicinity
of the Dow Chemical Company and the Montville power plant.

A compari-

son of the benefit/cost ratios for various, depths discloses that the
costs are greater than the benefits and this portion of the project was
not recommended to the Public Works Committee.

(See Chart 8).

In the analysis the Navy dredging was considered but not used as
the justification for rejection or acceptance.
The result of this analysis was the recommendation from the Army
to Congress as follows:
"a. A 40-foot deep and 600-foot wide navigation channel from
.deep water in Long Island Sound along the line of the existing
33-foot deep channel, about 15,500 feet upstream to the Hess
Oil and Chemical Division dock;
b. A 40-acre turning basin, 30-feet deep, just north of the
40-foot channel;
c. A 4.9-acre maneuver a~ea, 32 feet deep, just south of the
Connecticut State Pier."
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CHART 6
NEW LONOON HARBOR BENEFIT/COST RATIO FOR VARIOUS CHANNEL DEPTHS
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CHART 7
COMPARISON OF COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR HARBOR CHANNEL OF VARIOUS DEP'DIS
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CHART 8
nIAMES RIVER CHANNEL BENEFIT/COST RATIO FOR VARIOUS CHANNEL DEP'IHS
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The total first cost of the recommended project was estimated
at $12,500,000 for construction and $10,000 for aids to navigation,
resulting in annual costs of $758,000.

The estimated benefits were

$2,264,000 annually, resulting in a benefit/cost ratio of 2.98.
During the course of the study, the environmental impact of the
project was considered concurrently.

A cursory analysis indicated

that the ecological damage would be minimal within the channel and
harbor, with only the disposal of dredge materials presenting any significant problems.

However, public law now requires that an Environmental

Impact Statement accompany any major construction project.

A preliminary

draft of this statement was prepared and issued on 12 June 1972.
The summary sheet attached to the draft statement identified seven
potentially adverse environmental impacts:

'-'

" 1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Localized alteration of habitat(s)
Destruction and redistribution of benthio biota
Temporary and localized increases in turbidity and siltation
Release of offensive gases such as hydrogen sulfide
Resuspension of non-biodegradable chemical pollutants and
organics
Temporary increase in BOD and COD
Synergistic effects of heavy metals, organics, temperature
and salinity on zooplankton, fin fish and benthic
invertebrates. ,,6

Furthermore the environmental study considered five alternative
methods of completing the project:
"a.
b.
c.

Variations in channel design
Dredging Methods: Hydraulic versus Bucket
Dredge Spoil Disposal
1. Onshore
2. Creaton of Islands
3. Dredge Spoil Forming
4. Incineration
5. Pipeline Systems
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d.
e.

6. Ocean Disposal
Reduction or Elimination of Dredging
No action." 7

Finally the environmental study was forwarded to twelve government
and private agencies and associations for comment.
Many of the environmental impacts discussed in this study depart
drastically from the approach followed in the initial survey report.

....

Where the survey report could be specific and quantitative, the
environmental study was general and vague.

Where the survey report

could clearly identify the unknowns and assumptions the environmental
study could only plead a lack of knowledge.

This apparent dichotomy

of approaches to this problem is understandable.

Many of the adverse

effects of the project on the local ecology are secondary or terciary
conditions; they are difficult to define with accuracy and almost
impossible to quantify in terms of dollar costs.
Furthermore, to obtain the data and knowledge required to refine
the ecological estimates requires time and money.

Often the cost of

these studies exceeds the potential economic benefits from the project
and occasionally the cost of the project itself.

Even more troublesome

is the time required to make these ecological studies.

Many of the

effects of the project are long-term and to properly evaluate these
effects requires years.
Some projects are of sufficient magnitude and duration to include
in the cost of construction a research program to evaluate environmental
impacts.

Occasionally the only practical method of evaluating the

environmental impact is to complete the project and then observe the
.

damage produced on the local ecology.
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In spite of these inherent difficulties, the Corps did conduct
studies of the composition of the sediments, alternate methods, and
researched all available data pertaining to the marine life in the area.
An analysis of the sediments in the areas to be dredged showed
that the average values of the amounts of harmful materials were within
the EPA guidelines, with the exception of zinc, which exceeded the
guidelines by only 1.53%.

These analyses compared favorably with
~

similar studies conducted by the U.S. Navy.
Information on the marine life in the area is meager, however,
the Corps did research the available literature produced by the Navy
Underwater Sound Laboratory, the Naval Underwater Systems Center, the
Universities of Rhode Island and Connecticut, Connecticut College,
and the Environmental Protection Agency.

The conclusion derived from

these sources was that there was little marine life in the dredging
area that would suffer damage.

At this point only general comments

could be made concerning the spoil disposal sites, since at the time
several were being considered.
Once the meager ecological data had been analyzed, several
alternative methods of construction were considered in order to minimize
the environmental impact.
Several channel design variations were considered, but each of
these variations were found to have the same environmental impact.
Of course the design producing the greatest amount of dredge spoil
would do the most environmental damage.
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The type of dredge was considered.

Of the two common methods,

bucket or hydraulic, the bucket dredge would create the least damage
in the harbor area.
dlli~ping

However, bucket dredges generally require ocean

sites with the attendant damage at the dump site.

Therefore,

container disposal in conjunction with hydraulic dredging was evaluated,
but determined to be too expensive.

Estimates for-the container struc-

ture ranged between 8 to 10 million dollars.

In addition, suitable

container locations that would avoid pollution or

become a hazard to

navigation, were not readily available.
Incineration of the dredge spoil was determined to be excessively

,"

expensive and undesirable from the standpoint of air pollution.
Other spoil disposal methods were considered and rejected due to
expense or local geography.

Included were spoil farming, creation of

islands and onshore disposal.

..

.

Offshore pipelines and terminals would completely eliminate
dredging requirements.

These had been previously considered and

rejected in the economic analysis.

Furthermore, the danger of massive

oil spills and the difficulty of containment in open water would add
to the potential environmental hazards.
The only method of spoil disposal considered feasible was ocean
dumping.

Three sites were proposed and each met with some opposition

by either Federal, State or local interests.

Two additional sites

have been considered but their use would add to the cost of the project,
reducing the benefit/cost ratio from 5.12 to 1.97.
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Finally the environmental

i~pact

of no action, i.e., continued

use of the present waterway, was considered.

In addition to the obvious

loss of economic benefits, it is possible that the increased number of
.-

vessels and the additional handling and transfer of petroleum and
chemical products within the harbor could result in a greater danger
of accidental oil and chemical spills.
The conclusion of the environmental impact statement was that
there would be little, if any, long-term damage to the local ecology,
with the possible exception of the tmmediate area of the spoil disposal
site.

These conclusions have since been borne out by the objections

of environmentalists to the selection of the disposal sites.
This draft environmental statement was forwarded to all interested
Federal, State and private interests, with any involvement in the
environmental problems.

A survey conducted by the author of this

paper, confirms that most of the key individuals and organizations were
informed of the proposed Corps actions prior to the "final public hearing
on the project.

While many expressed general misgivings on the harmful

environmental effects, none had specific knowledge or data to refute
the environmental study conclusions.
The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection has objected
to this impact statement because it did not adequately consider these
environmental effects.

Representatives of the Department insisted

that additional environmental data was available and had not been used.
The individuals from the Corps responsible for the impact statement
claimed that repeated efforts to obtain this data, or even information
relating to the location of the data, had been unsuccessful.
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An apparent lack of communication and understanding between
these agencies was readily apparent.

This is partially a result of a

and the problems implementing this new requirement in Corps operations.

,t

These communication problems will probably be resolved in conferences

t

recent reorganization of the Department of Environmental Protection

scheduled between these two agencies in the near future.

..
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It is

interesting to note that similar problems with other New England

•

States were much more rapidly resolved.
On

London.

April 12, 1972, a final stage public hearing was held at New
The purpose of this hearing was to present the draft findings

of the survey report and environmental statement.

I\~

t .:
.,.

The New England

Division of the Corps maintains computer printouts to insure all
interested parties are supplied with these reports.
At the final public hearing Dow Chemical asked for and was granted
additional time to present data that might change the unfavorable
recommendation on the Thames River channel improvements.

A thirty

day period was granted, but no substantially different data was forthcoming.

Also at this hearing the Navy representatives proposed coor-

dinating the dredging of their respective portions of the project to
obtai~

lower unit dredging costs.

This proved to be infeasible due to

the urgency of the Navy project and the earliest commencement of the
Corps work would be in FY 1976.
At this point, the New England Division portion of the report was
complete and the recommendations were forwarded to the Chief of Engineers.
The report is reviewed in the Office of the Chief of Engineers by the

...
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11.

Directorate of Civil Works.

If the report is complete it is submitted

to the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors.

The purpose of this

independent review is to finalize the recommendations on the project
to the Public Works Committee.

Since the benefits exceed the costs the

decision of the Board will be favorable.
The favorable report is circulated for comments to the Governor of
Connecticut and to other Federal agencies.

At this stage, the final

formal coordination is generally automatic, since close and continuous
coordination is maintained throughout the course of the study and,
where possible, conflicts resolved prior to the final submission.
Once the coordination has been completed, the Chief of Engineers
transmits the report to the Secretary of the Army.

After a cursory

review in the Secretary's office the report is cleared through the Office
of Management and Budget to insure that it fits into the President's
program.

If there is no objection by the Office of Management and

Budget the Secretary submits the report to the Public Works Committee.
If the Committee concurs with the favorable recommendation, the
report will be printed as a public document and included in the next
Rivers and Harbors Bill.

The project is authorized for construction

once the bill has been passed by Congress and signed into law by the
President.
To obtain the funds for construction, the Chief of

E~gineers

clears

the request for funds through the Office of Management and Budget and
transmits it back to Congress.

Once the project has been included in

an appropriations bill, and passed by both the House of Representatives
29
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ana the Senate, then signed by the President the construction may
proceed.
Next the Division Engineer is directed to prepare plans, specifications and an estimate of costs.

Invitations for bids are made

public and mailed to prospective bidders.

The successful bidder,

generally the lowest, is selected and construction initiated.
It can be readily seen that this entire process is lengthy and a
time-consuming operation.

Several years elapse from the inspection

to the completion of the project.

At many levels of government there

are technical, fiscal and political reviews to insure that the public
funds are properly utilized.
How effective is this decision process?

In the many years since

the first boulders and snags were removed from the Thames River the
Corps of Engineers has probably spent over a billion dollars in these
types of activities.

Most, but certainly not all of these projects

have equalled or exceeded the economic predictions, but in the fast
pace of modern technology and rapidly changing national values, is
this still a viable means of constructing public works?
~'.'

The answers to these questions must be a qualified affirmative.
While there are many areas that could be improved, the basic procedure
appears to be valid.
The study approach, particularly the computation of benefits, is
conservative.

Only those items that could be clearly identified and

quantified are included in the benefit/cost ratio.

Even in this area

there are procedures that could be questioned by both engineers and
economists.
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The fifty year project life is standard for navigation projects,
but a one hundred year life is not uncommon for flood control projects.
It would appear that this standard project life could be more flexible
and better relate to each particular situation.

In this project a

thirty year project life would be more compatible with the majority of
the economic projections used in the study.
The interest rate and discount rate are somewhat lower than is
customarily used in Department of Defense analyses.

However, the

method of determining this rate has been established by Congress and
can not be changed by more than 1/4 percent each year.
The benefits are reduced to an annual basis by averaging and
discounting them over the life of the project.

Perhaps a more accurate

method would project and then discount each individual annual benefit.
This would be particularly important if a known major change were to
occur during the project life.

For example, the conversion of a large

power plant from coal to oil, resulting in a sudden increase in
petroleum tonnage.

In this particular case the use of the annual

average would not affect the results since the projected use of
petroleum is based upon average values.
the

~enefits

However, the assumption that

will always accrue at a uniform rate will not always be

true.
The advantages of following standard procedures or methodologies
are obvious.

Standardization assists Congress and the Office of

Management and Budget to compare projects with one another.

Constant

changes of basic parameters would undoubtedly lead to charges of Corps
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manipulation of the facts and result in intense political pressure to
revise these standards in order to achieve a favorable report on a
project.
The Corps has a responsibility to remain as objective as possible
and the maintenance of standard procedures can enhance achieving this
goal.
In this study there are obvious economic benefits that were
considered but did not become a factor in the benefit/cost ratio.

For

example, industrial land along the improved waterway would attract .new
commerical ventures and the lowering of petroleum transportation rates
could cause inland users to shift their source of supply.

There are

numerous secondary benefits that would naturally follow in the wake of
this project.

These additional benefits are difficult to measure and

should be excluded from the quantitative analysis.

They should be

included in the report so that they may be considered and evaluated.
In this report some of the secondary benefits were included, but they
could have been discussed in greater detail.
Representatives of the Corps indicated that the Office of Management and Budget was the toughest critic of their reports.

.

~.

Here the

quantitative factors are carefully scrutinized and, therefore, they
are emphasized in the report perhaps more than they should be.
Another criticism that has been leveled at this report by environmentalists, is the apparent lack of consideration of alternative means
of accomplishing the objective.

There is the suspicion that the Corps

has overlooked or down-played any alternative that would not include
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The

Corps participation.

const~uction

of pipelines or off-shore

terminals would be accomplished by private industry and were readily
dismissed as viable alternatives.
This feeling may have been reinforced by the lack of depth of the
discussion that these alternatives received in the report.

However,

the author of the report insists that this was not indicative of the
effort spent upon these alternatives, and is contrary to Corps policy.
Rather, the details of the consideration of these alternatives were
deliberately omitted from the report for simplicity because the quantity
of petroleum involved, the optimum size tanker and the lack of area in
which to expand oil storage facilities, rendered these alternatives
obviously uneconomical.
The environmental impact of this type of project is probably the
most critical aspect.

Many Corps projects have been halted or delayed

by the recent assaults of environmental interests.

At the worst these

attacks have resulted in court orders and law suits, at best a delay
in completing the survey report.

I

In this project the greatest objection arose from the proposal to
dump the dredge spoil in the waters immediately offshore of the harbor.
Although neither side to this dispute could present a factual case based
on hard data, this single objection could drive the decision on the
project.

As the proponent for the new work, the burden of proof lies

with the Federal government.

As difficult as it may be to quantify

these environmental costs, the Corps has the responsibility to do
wherever possible.

80

For example, it appears that some attempt could
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have been made to estimate the impact of these disposal sites on sport
and commercial fishing.

The amount of sea floor that would be affected

could have been calculated.

The recovery time for the area to regain

its original conditions could have been estimated.

Even if these facts

were presented in gross terms or in best/worst case terms it would
provide the decision makers a better basis for judgment.
The Corps agreed that this proposal appeared to be feasible, but
expressed doubts as to its practicality.

Vague numbers can be very

dangerous and are subject to being misquoted and misunderstood.

The

general feeling of the Corps was that only those numerical values that
were clearly established should be included in the report.

This is

obviously the safest course, but may not adequately present all sides
of the problem.
One aspect that everyone interviewed agreed upon was the responsibility of the Corps to make value judgments on the social, political
and environmental conditions.

Although this area is fraught with

problems, the Corps is probably best equipped

with the technical

capabilities to properly evaluate these conditions.

It appears that

the Corps is moving reluctantly into these controversial areas in the
repo~ts

on several recent projects.

An honest attempt to quantify as

much of the environmental impact as possible will help in placing
these conditions in perspective and reduce some of the less responsible
opposition from environmental sources.
Governmental agencies at state and federal levels are undergoing
some growing pains as they reorganize to meet the environmental
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demands of recent legislation.

This has resulted in a lack of

communication and understanding between the Corps and, in this project,
the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection.
The Corps, throughout this study, has made a vigorous attempt to
inform the public of their plans and intentions.

Although occasional

criticism, particularly from other governmental agencies, is directed
at the lack of information, some of the individuals contacted indicated
that they were engulfed by too much data.

The

vas~

majority of the

public were aware of the proposed project, but few really understood
the factors involved.

The Corps representatives admitted that the

public hearings instead of producing discussion on the project, generally
resulted in an explanation of the proposed

projee~.

This problem can be resolved by a better public information program.
Perhaps a simpler, and more readable, presentation o£ the report would
suffice to keep the majority of the public informed.
The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection felt that
the environmental impact statement and survey report should be combined
into a single document.

The Corps representatives agreed that this

might be advantageous, but the present policy reqnired that these documents stand by themselves.

Since the

requiremen~

to submit an environ-

mental impact statement was instituted after the survey report had been
completed, there was a delay of several months between theiT respective
completion dates.

This situation should improve in future projects, but

the difficulty of obtaining environmental data will probably continue to
cause delays in the finalization of environmental impact statements.
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Finally, underlying many comments by private individuals and
some governmental agencies, was the feeling of being overpowered by the
Corps of Engineers and the Federal bureaucracy.

This is a natural

reaction when confronting a large governmental agency whose concern is
more national than regional.

Under these circumstances individual

projects may not receive the degree of concern that local interests
might consider to be reasonable.
On the other hand, the Corps is accused of pushing some projects
harder than others, particularly if the project is in another state or
is especially harmful to the environment.

However, the Corps is closely

attuned to the President's policies, the priorities and programs of the
Office of Management and Budget, and the wishes of Congress, and these
realistic constraints must be considered if a project is to have any
chance of approval.

The Corps does make an effort to remain objective

and only to recommend those projects that are beneficial to the general
welfare of the public but some parochial interest can creep into the
report.

Hopefully, the approval procedures that require review at

several levels of the organization should eliminate those projects that
would benefit only small sectors of the country.
Some individuals indicated that the benefits appeared to accrue
to special interests (such as the petroleum industry in this project).
There was some concern that these benefits might not be passed on to the
consumers and the general public.

Furthermore, no post project studies

had been conducted to insure that in the past benefits were received by
the public.

This could bea valid complaint, but involves arguments
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on the role of the Federal government in the private sector that began
with the first public works in the eighteenth century.

Such a radical

philosophical change in governmental activities is beyond the scope of
this paper.
Recommendations that would improve this decision process fall into
three general areas:

the survey report, the environmental impact and

the general public understanding of the Corps position.
First the quantitative portion of the survey report is adequate.
It prOVides a standard for comparison between competing projects that
is straightforward and reasonable.

The qualitative and unquantifiab1e
1---

aspects could be more clearly presented and gross estimates of costs or
benefits included wherever possible.

Alternatives should be rigorously

explored and clearly explained when rejected.
Second, the environmental impact statement should attempt to
quantify the environmental costs wherever possible.

The cost of studies

to obtain data to evaluate environmental impact should be included in
the report.

Every effort should be made to alleviate any feelings that

these factors were not given full consideration.

While progress has

been made in this regard, the general credibility gap must be reduced •
.Finally, the public and other governmental agencies must be better
! .

informed of the operations, goals and particularly the limitations of
the Corps of Engineers in the conduct of these projects.

The Corps has

silently borne criticism that may not be within their power to correct.
Communications between the Corps and environmental interests must be
improved.
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